We present a simple lambda-calculus whose syntax is populated by variables which behave like meta-variables. It can express both capture-avoiding and capturing substitution (instantiation). To do this requires several innovations, including a key insight in the confluence proof and a set of reduction rules which manages the complexity of a calculus of contexts over the 'vanilla' lambda-calculus in a very simple and modular way. This calculus remains extremely close in look and feel to a standard lambda-calculus with explicit substitutions, and good properties of the lambda-calculus are preserved. These include a Hindley-Milner type system with principal typings and subject reduction, and an applicative characterisation of contextual equivalence.
Introduction
This is a paper about a λ-calculus for contexts. A context is a term with a 'hole'. The canonical example is probably C[-] = λx.-in the λ-calculus. This is not λ-calculus syntax because it has a hole -, but if we fill that hole with a term t then we obtain something, we usually write it C[t], which is a λ-calculus term.
For example if C[-] = λx.-then C[x] = λx.x and C[y] = λx.y. This cannot be modelled by a combination of λ-abstraction and application, because β-reduction avoids capture. Formally: there is no λ-term f such that f t = C [t] . The term λz.λx.z is the obvious candidate, but (λz.λx.z)x = λx .x.
(We shall use '=' to denote α-equality of terms.)
Contexts arise often in proofs of meta-properties in functional programming. They have been substantially investigated in papers by Pitts on contextual equivalence between terms in λ-calculi (with global state) [24, 27] . This work was about proving programs equivalent in all contexts -contextual equivalence. The idea is that two programs, represented by possibly-open λ-terms, are equivalent when one can be exchanged for another in code. That code might have binders which bind variables in the scope of the 'hole' within which we are substituting, whence the need for binders.
This suggests that we should call holes context variables X (distinct from 'normal' variables x) and allow λ-abstraction over them to obtain a λ-calculus of contexts, so that we can study program contexts with the full panoply of vocabulary, and hopefully with many of the theorems, of the λ-calculus. For example λx.-may be represented by λX.λx.X. Substitution for X does not avoid capture with respect to 'ordinary' λ-abstraction, so (λX.λx.X)x reduces to λx.x.
A context calculus can have applications besides aspects of proofs of contextual equivalence.
Consider formalising mathematics in a logical framework based on HigherOrder Logic (HOL) [37] . Typically we have a goal and some assumptions and we want a derivation of one from the other. This derivation may be represented by a λ-term (the Curry-Howard correspondence). But the derivation is arrived at by stages in which it is incomplete. 
A⇒C
To the right are two derivations of A⇒B⇒C, A⇒B A⇒C. The bottom one is complete, the top one is incomplete. 1 An issue arises because the right-most [A] i in the bottom (complete) derivation is discharged, which means that we have to be able to instantiate ? in a sub-derivation for an assumption which will be discharged. Discharge corresponds in the Curry-Howard correspondence precisely to λ-abstraction, and this instantiation corresponds to capturing substitution. Similar issues arise with existential variables [14, Section 2, Example 3].
The central issue for any calculus of contexts is the interaction of context variables with α-equivalence. Let x, y, z be 'ordinary' variables and let X be a context variable. If λx.X = λy.X then (λX.λx.X)x λy.x, giving nonconfluent reductions. Dropping α-equivalence entirely is too drastic; we need λy.λx.y to be α-convertible with λz.λx.z so that we can reduce a term such as (λy.λx.y)x.
Solutions include clever control of substitution and evaluation order [30] , types to prevent 'bad' α-conversions [28, 16, 29] , explicit labels on meta-variables [14, 18] , and more [4, Section 2] . More on this in the Conclusions.
In this paper we present a new calculus of contexts, the 'lambda context calculus' (LCC). We took our technical ideas for handling α-equivalence not from the literature on context calculi cited above, but from nominal unification [36] . This was designed to manage α-equivalence in the presence of holes, in unification -'unification of contexts of syntax', in other words. Crudely put, we obtained the LCC by allowing λ-abstraction over the holes and adding β-reduction.
This work has similar goals to the N EWcc previously developed by the first author [9] . The LCC has a simpler and more intuitive set of reduction rules. Indeed there is now only one non-obvious side-condition, it is on (σp); Technical aspects of the previous work have been simplified, clarified, or eliminated altogether. Notably we dispense entirely with the freshness contexts and freshness logic of the N EWcc.
The result is a clean and simple system with a powerful hierarchy of context variables, yet which has the look and feel of an ordinary λ-calculus with explicit substitutions, along with many of the properties which make the λ-calculus so nice to work with. These include confluence, a Hindley-Milner type system with principal typings and subject reduction, and an applicative characterisation of contextual equivalence.
2 Syntax, freshness, reductions
Syntax
We suppose a countably infinite set of disjoint infinite sets of variables A 1 , A 2 , . . . , where we write a i , b i , c i , n i , . . . ∈ A i for i ≥ 1.
We shall use a permutative naming convention; we shall always assume that variables that we give different names, are different. Thus a i and b i range permutatively over elements of A i . In particular, when we write a i and c k we do not assume (unless stated otherwise) that i = k, but we do assume that even if i = k, a i and c k are different variables, because we have given them different names.
There is no particular connection between variables of different levels with the same name. For example a 1 and a 2 are different variables to which we happen to have given similar names.
Definition 1 The syntax of the lambda context calculus (LCC) is given by:
We use the following conventions:
• As is standard, application associates to the left. For example tt t is (tt )t .
• We say that the variable a i has level i.
• We call b j stronger than a i when j > i, that is, when b j has higher level than a i . If j < i we call b j weaker than a i . If i = j we say that b j and a i have the same strength. • We call s[a i →t] an explicit substitution of level i (for the atom a, acting on s).
• We call λa i .t an abstraction of level i (over the term t).
• Later on we shall use the convention that x, y, z are variables of level 1, X, Y, Z are variables of level 2, and W has level 3.
This syntax has no constant symbols. We might like to have constants like 1, 2, 3, . . . for arithmetic, or and ⊥ for truth-values. These behave much like variables 'of level 0' which we do not abstract over and for which we do not substitute. We may add them where convenient for illustrative examples. Adding them formally to the syntax causes no particular difficulties aside from adding extra cases to a few proofs. Here max(i, j) is the greater of i and j, and max(i, j, k) is the greatest of i, j, and k.
For the reader's convenience we mention now that we write 'level(s 1 , . . . , s n ) ≤ i' as shorthand for 'level(s 1 ) ≤ i and . . . and level(s n ) ≤ i', similarly for 'level(s 1 , . . . , s n ) < i'; this will be useful later.
Lemma 3 If level(s) = 1 then fv(s) coincides with the usual notion of 'free variables of ' for the untyped λ-calculus, if we read s[a 1 →t] as (λa 1 .s)t.
We shall see that the operational behaviour of such terms is the same as well.
α-equivalence
Definition 4 A congruence on LCC terms is a binary relation s R s satisfying the conditions of Figure 3 .
It is easy to show that a congruence is reflexive, so perhaps a better name would be 'congruent equivalence relation' -but 'congruence' is shorter so we use that.
Definition 5 Define an (atoms) swapping (a i b i )s action inductively by the rules in Figure 4 .
Note that the definition of the swapping action is absolutely uniform, literally swapping a i and b i in s without regard to binders et cetera. This is very characteristic of the underlying 'nominal' method of this paper [13, 36] .
We will use swapping (a i b i ) on sets of variables S acting pointwise by
Here c ranges over all elements of S, including a i and b i (if they are in S).
Proof By easy inductions on the definition of (a i b i )s. 2
Definition 7
If S is a set of variables write a i #S for
• a i ∈ S, and
• there exists no variable b j ∈ S such that j > i.
Lemma 8 If level(t) < j then b j #fv(t).
Proof We work by induction on the definition of level(t).
• The case of a i . level(a i ) = i. So suppose that i < j. It follows from the definition of fv that b j #fv(a i ).
• The case of tt . level(tt ) = level(t) ∪ level(t ). fv(tt ) = fv(t) ∪ fv(t ). The result follows by the inductive hypothesis.
The result follows by the inductive hypothesis.
• The case of s[a i →t] is similar.
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Definition 9 Let α-equivalence be the least congruence relation s = α s satisfying the conditions of Figure 5 .
Suppose that x and y have level 1 and X has level 2. We can easily verify that:
• It is not possible to α-convert a i in s if b j ∈ fv(s) for j > i. For example λx.X = α λy.X. This is consistent with a reading of strong variables as unknown terms with respect to weaker variables.
• We can never α-convert variables to variables of other levels.
Lemma 10
If s mentions only variables of level 1, then α-equivalence collapses to the usual α-equivalence on untyped λ-terms (plus an explicit substitution).
Parenthetical note: The definitions above are descended from the notion of α-equivalence for nominal terms from [36] . In the terminology used here, that paper considered a syntax with a hierarchy with just levels 1 and 2 and no abstraction over variables of level 2. However LCC is weaker in the sense that nominal terms include swappings in the syntax of terms. We use swappings as an operation on LCC syntax (Definition 5) but we have not included them in the syntax of the LCC itself.
Extending LCC syntax with swappings is future work. To do that it would help to have a better understanding of LCC models (this paper is purely syntactic) and of freshness a#t. Another paper does explore the notion of freshness in the presence of a hierarchy [10] .
Proof The proof is by an easy induction on the derivation rule defining a congruence. We give only the base cases:
Suppose level(s) ≤ i. By Lemma 6 level((b i a i )s) ≤ i as well. Then using Lemma 6 we have
It follows by easy set calculations that
We also observe that swapping a i and b i in s has no effect on the levels of the variables occurring in s, and it follows easily that
Note that
We use the previous part.
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Theorem 11 guarantees that we can α-convert without changing the levels or sets of free variables. We use these facts (especially in the proof of confluence when we write 'renaming if necessary') without comment henceforth.
Reductions
Definition 12 Define the reduction relation on terms (modulo α-equivalence) inductively by the rules in Figure 6 .
In that figure consistent with our conventions variables with different names are assumed distinct. For example in (σλ ) we assume that a i and c i are distinct.
We shall use the following notation:
• We write * for the transitive reflexive closure of . • We write s when there exists no t such that s t. If s we call s a normal form, as is standard.
• We write s (ruleset) t when we can deduce s t but using only rules in (ruleset) where (ruleset) ⊆ {(β), (σa), (σfv), (σp), (σσ), (σλ), (σλ )}.
(Later in Section 6 we extend reduction with rules for a binder N.)
• We call terminating when there is no infinite sequences
Similarly for (ruleset) .
• We call confluent when if s * t and s * t then there exists some u such that t * u and t * u. Similarly for (ruleset).
This is all standard [33, 1] .
We take a moment to note two easy but important technical properties: reductions decrease the level of a term, and its set of free variables.
Proof By a series of easy calculations on the rules in Figure 6 and an inductive argument. Proof We work by induction on the derivation of s s . The base cases are:
• fv(a i [a i →t]) = fv(t) and fv(t) is a subset of itself.
• Suppose that a i #fv(s). By definition
From Lemma 8 we deduce that fv(s) \ {a i } = fv(s) and so fv(s) is a subset
The subset inclusion follows by easy calculations on sets.
Other cases are no harder. The inductive argument is straightforward, relying on Lemma 13. The corollary is immediate. 2
Example reductions
The LCC is a λ-calculus with explicit substitutions [20] . The general form of the σ-rules is familiar from the literature though the conditions, especially those involving levels, are not; we discuss them in Subsection 2.6 below.
First, we consider some example reductions. Recall our convention that we write x, y, z for variables of level 1, and X, Y, Z for variables of level 2.
• β-reduction. This is a standard β-reduction rule for a calculus with explicit substitutions:
• Substitutions on variables. The behaviour of a substitution on a variable depends on the relative strengths of the variable being substituted on, and the variable being substituted for:
We can summarise the behaviour of substitutions on variables as follows:
• A strong substitution acting on a weak variable 'evaporates'.
• A substitution of a variable acting on itself acts 'normally'.
• A substitution of a variable acting on another variable of the same strength 'evaporates'.
• A weak substitution on a strong variable 'stays put'.
• Traversing weak variables.
An explicit substitution for a relatively strong variable may distribute using (σσ) under an explicit substitution for a relatively weaker variable, without avoiding capture:
Similarly, an explicit substitutions for a relatively strong variable can traverse a λ-abstraction by a relatively weaker variable, using (σλ), without avoiding capture:
λx.x. This makes strong variables behave like 'holes'. Instantiation of holes is compatible with β-reduction; here is a typical example:
• Substitutions on no weaker substitutions. These terms do not reduce:
Here (σa) and (σfv) are not applicable because X has level 2 and x has level 1, and (σσ) is not applicable because both x and y have level 1. So weak substitutions are 'suspended' -until a stronger substitution turns X into something with internal structure which they can act on. We imagine stronger versions of the LCC (i.e. with more reductions) in the Conclusions.
• 
• Substitutions as terms [x →y] is not a term; it cannot be the argument to a function. However λX.X[x →y] is a term, and it acts like a substitution in the following sense:
As a general scheme, λb j .b j [a i →s] encodes the substitution [a i →s] if level(s) ≤ j and i < j.
Comments on the side-conditions
The side-conditions of the LCC reduction rules are where much of the technical 'magic' happens.
• (σfv) is a form of garbage-collection. We do not want to garbage-collect
] because (σσ) could turn X into something with x free -for example x itself. This is why the side-condition is not a i ∈ fv(s). For example x ∈ fv(X) = {X} and so with a false version of the rule with a side-condition using ∈ instead of # we have reductions
This is blocked in LCC, because x#X does not hold.
It is unusual for a garbage collection rule to appear in a calculus of explicit substitutions; usually we can 'push substitutions into a term until they reach variables' so we make do with a rule of the form b[a →t]
b. In the LCC we cannot always push substitutions into a term until they reach variables, because of the conditions on (σp) and (σλ ). A version of (σfv) does appear in the literature as Bloo's 'garbage collection' [3] .
• Recall that the level of a term is the level of the strongest variable it contains, free or bound. Recall also that the side-condition level(s, s , t) ≤ i in (σp) means that level(s) ≤ i and similarly for s and t. This condition seems to be fundamental for confluence to work; we have not been able to sensibly weaken it, even if we also change other rules to fix what goes wrong when we do. Here is what happens if we drop the side-condition entirely:
The term (λx.X)[y →x] does not reduce (more on that in the Conclusions).
• The side-conditions on (σσ), (σλ), and (σλ ) implement that a relatively strong substitution can capture but substitution for variables of the same level avoids capture. There is no rule
since that would destroy termination of the part of the LCC without λ -and we have managed to get confluence without it.
• There is no rule permitting a weak substitution to propagate under a stronger abstraction, even if we avoid capture:
Such a rule would cause the following problem for confluence:
Neither of these terms reduces further.
As is the case for the side-condition of (σp), any stronger form of (σλ ) seems to provoke a cascade of changes which make the calculus more complex.
Investigation of these side-conditions is linked to strengthening the theory of freshness and α-equivalence, and possibly to developing a good semantic theory to guide us. This is future work and some details are mentioned in the Conclusions.
The substitution action
Definition 15 Let (sigma) be equal to the set of rewrite rules other than (β), namely,
This is the part of the LCC that handles substitution -the 'λ-free' part of the calculus.
We expect the λ-free part of other calculi of explicit substitutions to be terminating [3, 20] and this is useful behaviour -but now we have a hierarchy of variables. Do we lose this good behaviour? No, and in this section we prove it.
Termination of (sigma)
We show that (sigma)-reduction decreases terms with respect to a wellfounded ordering based on mapping LCC terms to first-order terms (no variables, no binders), and using a lexicographic path ordering [19, 1] on them.
We use first-order terms in the following infinite signature:
Here f /n indicates that f has arity n. Symbols have the following precedence:
We define the lexicographic path ordering by:
Here g/m and f /n are first-order symbols and t 1 , . . . , t n , t 1 , . . . , t n , u 1 , . . . , u m , s are first-order terms.
It is a fact [19, 1] that is a well-founded order on first-order terms satisfying the subterm property, i.e. if s is a subterm of t then s t.
We define a translation from LCC to first-order terms as follows:
Proof We check for each reduction rule that the corresponding first-order term on the left, is higher in the lexicographic path ordering than the one on the right. This is routine:
Corollary 17 (sigma)-reduction terminates.
if a i #fv(s), and otherwise. . . We can now make a useful observation. Let x have level 1. It is easy to show that (λx.xx)(λx.xx) has an infinite series of reductions if we allow rules in (sigma) and (β). It follows that -even with a hierarchy of variables -(β) strictly adds to the power of the reduction system.
Definition 18 Call s (sigma)-normal when s (sigma)
.
By Corollary 17, any chain of (sigma)-reductions must terminate, and by definition it terminates at a (sigma)-normal form.
What does that (sigma)-normal form look like?
Calculating (sigma)-normal forms

Definition 19
Define a substitution action s[a i :=t] by the equalities in Figure 7 .
The precedence of which equality in Figure 7 to use is from top to bottom. Also, when we try to apply the equality (λc i . 
Confluence
Recall from Definition 15 that (sigma) is the set of rules defined by
It is convenient to define:
Definition 24 Let (beta) be the set {(β), (σλ), (σλ ), (σfv)}.
Note that (sigma) ∪ (beta) is equal to the set of all reduction rules of the LCC.
Note that (sigma) ∩ (beta) is non-empty. We mention the technical reasons for this just after Lemma 39 -it seems to be vital for the proofs to work. Understanding the deeper mathematical reasons for this, if any, is future work.
Theorem 25 is confluent. That is, if s * t 1 and s * t 2 then there is some u such that t 1 * u and t 2 * u.
The proof of Theorem 25 occupies this section. Before we give the details we comment on the overall design of the proof.
Roughly speaking there are two standard ways to prove confluence:
(1) Define a so-called parallel reduction relation ⇒. such that ⇒⊆ * and ⇒ * = * . It then suffices to show that if s ⇒ t 1 and s ⇒ t 2 then there is some u such that t 1 ⇒ u and t 2 ⇒ u. Both of these methods are standard [33] . But which to use for the LCC?
It seems that reductions using (β) 'want' method 1 above -but (sigma)-reductions 'want' method 2. To prove confluence of the LCC, we split the reduction relation into (sigma) and (beta); we prove confluence results by methods 1 and 2 above independently, and then we combine them.
Confluence of (sigma)
Lemmas 27 and 29 will be useful; Lemma 27 in this subsection and Lemma 29 in Subsection 4.3. Since these results are closely related so we have put them side-by-side here.
We need this technical lemma in a moment:
(Note the lack of capture-avoidance condition; this is because i < j.) Proof By induction on i and then on the structure of s.
This covers the cases s = c k with k > i, s = s 1 s 2 with level(
• Suppose k ≤ i < j. Note that by our permutative convention, c k is distinct from a i . Then:
= c k .
Finally by Lemma 26 we have
• Suppose (renaming c i where possible) that c i #fv(t). Then
We need a technical lemma for Lemma 29:
Lemma 28 If s is (sigma)-normal and level(s) ≤ i then there is no substitution of level i in s.
Proof By a routine induction on s.
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Lemma 29 Suppose that level(s, t, u) ≤ i and a i #fv(u) (which in view of the condition on levels, means just a i ∈ fv(u)). Suppose also that s, t, and u are (sigma)-normal. Then
Proof By induction on the structure of s.
• Suppose k ≤ i. Recall that by our permutative convention c k is distinct from a i and b i . Then:
• The cases of
• We do not need to consider the case c k [
• For the case of s[c k →s ], assumed to be be (sigma)-normal, we know from the assumption level(s[c k →s ]) ≤ i and Lemma 28 that k < i. Hence,
We now come back to the confluence of (sigma).
(3) Recall that we assume that level(s, s , t) ≤ i.
(4) Recall that we assume that i < j. Using Lemma 27
(5) Recall that we assume that i < j. Proof We work by induction on the derivation of s (sigma) s , see Figure 6 .
In this proof, and in this proof only, we shall write for (sigma) and * for (sigma) * .
• • Now suppose that s (sigma) s is derived using one of the rules (σa), (σc), (σp), (σσ), (σλ), or (σλ ). In these cases we use Theorem 23 and the relevant part of Lemma 30.
Theorem 33 (sigma) is confluent.
Proof By an easy inductive argument using Lemma 32. 2 
(beta)-reduction
Definition 34 Inductively define the parallel reduction relation =⇒ (for (beta)) by the rules in Figure 9 . • (Pa) and (Pa). There is nothing to prove.
• (Pσ) and (Pσ)
It follows that
• (Pσ) and (Pσ ) for (σλ). Suppose s =⇒ s and t =⇒ t and also s =⇒ s and t =⇒ t . Suppose also that i < j so that by (Pσ) and (Pσ ) for (σλ)
By inductive hypothesis there are s and t such that s =⇒ s ⇐= s and t =⇒ t ⇐= t .
Using (Pσ ) for (σλ) and (Pσ)
• The case of (Pσ ) for (σλ) and (Pσ) is similar.
• (Pσ) and (Pσ ) for (σλ ). Suppose s =⇒ s and u =⇒ u and also s =⇒ s and u =⇒ u . Suppose also that (renaming a i where necessary) a i #u so that by (Pσ) and (Pσ ) for (σλ )
By inductive hypothesis there are s and u such that s =⇒ s ⇐= s and u =⇒ u ⇐= u .
By Corollary 36 a i #u . Using (Pσ ) for (σλ ) and (Pσ)
• (Pλ) with (Pλ).
Suppose Proof We work by induction on the derivation of s =⇒ s . For brevity we merely indicate the non-trivial parts.
We always assume that s =⇒ s , t =⇒ t , and u =⇒ u , where appropriate.
• (β) has a divergence with (σp) in the case that i < j and level(s, t, u) ≤ j:
This can be closed by:
• (β) has a divergence with (σp) in the case that i = j and level(s, t, u) ≤ i:
We suppose, renaming a i if necessary, that a i #u. 
which closes the divergence above.
• (σσ) has a divergence with (σλ). Suppose that k < i < j:
• (σσ) has a divergence with (σλ ). Suppose that i < j and (renaming c i where possible) c i #fv(t):
We know that b j #fv(t) because c i #fv(t) and i < j. We then deduce b j #fv(t ) using Corollary 36. We use this to justify the =⇒-rewrite which uses (σfv) in a moment. This can be closed by:
We promised to explain why (σ) ∩ (β) = ∅. We can now do so by reference to the details of the proof of Lemma 39.
• (σλ) ∈ (beta) and (σλ ) ∈ (beta) because otherwise the two cases of (σp) and (β) above, would not work.
• (σfv) ∈ (beta) because otherwise the case of (σσ) with (σλ ) would not work.
We can easily generalise this lemma to several σ-steps: 
The untyped lambda-calculus
We show how to translate the untyped λ-calculus into the LCC.
For convenience, we use the variables of level 1 in the LCC as variables in our λ-calculus; when we translate the λ-calculus into the LCC, we will use this identification.
Terms of the untyped λ-calculus are given by e ::= x | ee | λx.e.
λ binds x in λx.e. This is standard [2] .
We define a free variables of fv(t) function in the usual way:
fv(x) = {x} fv(ee ) = fv(e) ∪ fv(e ) fv(λx.e) = fv(e) \ {x}.
Call e open when there exists some x such that x ∈ fv(e).
Define a capture-avoiding substitution action inductively by: e → e λx.e → λx.e
We call e a normal form or value when there is no e such that e → e . Note that normal forms may be open.
A translation into the LCC is given by:
The following results are very easy to prove:
Proof We consider the clauses of the definition of fv above, and of the definition of fv from Figure 2 , and we see that they coincide in the special case that only variables of level 1 appear. Proof We work by induction on the structure of e.
• Proof We work by induction on the derivation of e → e .
• The case (β ] is a normal form.
As a corollary, if e is any untyped λ-term, then if e has a normal form then so does
Proof The corollary follows by Theorem 44.
It is a fact [2] that the normal forms of the untyped λ-calculus are inductively characterised (as a subset of the set of terms of the untyped λ-calculus) by:
The proof is by induction on V .
•
] = x and we check the reduction rules of the LCC and observe that x is a normal form.
We check the reduction rules of the LCC and observe that if [ [
] is a normal form. We check the reduction rules of the LCC and observe that if [ [ V ] ] is a normal form then so is λx.
] .
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6 A NEW part for the LCC
Some NEW rules
LCC λ-abstraction is weak in the sense that for example x is not α-convertible in λx.X, if x has level 1 and X has level 2.
Suppose we really do want to bind x in λx.X. That is, suppose we want to recover the notion of 'local variable' which the traditional λ-calculus (without a hierarchy of levels) identifies with functional abstraction.
We extend the syntax of the LCC as follows:
We extend the definition of level and fv (Definition 2) with clauses
We extend the definition of congruence (Definition 4) with a clause s R s
We extend the definition of swapping (Definition 5 ) with a clause
where c is any atom.
We extend the definition of α-equivalence (Definition 9) with a clause
Note the difference that in α-equivalence for λ-abstraction we check b i #fv(s) (Definition 7), and in α-equivalence for N-binding we check b i ∈ fv(s).
Variables bound by N rename regardless of whether stronger variables are present.
For example take x and y to be variables of level 1, and X and Y to be variables of level 2. Then λx.X = α λy.X but Nx.λx.X = α Ny.λy.X.
We add reduction rules
N has behaviour similar to that of π-calculus restriction [21] .
• ( Np) and ( Nσ) are reminiscent of scope-extrusion.
• ( N ∈) is reminiscent of 'garbage-collection'.
Here is an example reduction which exploits N:
Compare with a pair of related rewrites in the syntax without N:
So N binds and this is separated from the functional abstraction implemented by λ.
LCC syntax permits N also not directly above λ, for example in Nx.x. This behaves like a constant symbol and indeed fv( Nx.x) = ∅ (though note that level information is preserved; level( Na i .a i ) = i). The N which binds x ensures that it can never be substituted for:
(Recall that we take terms up to α-equivalence when discussing reductions.)
We shall make no use of terms of the form Nx.x in the examples to come. In this paper we are only interested in N to restore α-conversion behaviour to λ-abstracted variables which have been abstracted over a scope containing stronger variables. However, we expect a better understanding of N to be important for future work.
Some false NEW rules
We do not admit a rule
With ( NpFALSE) we can reduce as follows:
(λx.xx) Ny.y It is a fact that these terms are normal forms and they are not equal.
We can have an intuition of N as 'generating a fresh variable symbol'. Then ( NpFALSE) (with the other rules of the LCC) lets us make a non-confluent choice of whether to generate a name, then copy, or copy and then generate.
For similar reasons we do not admit ( NσFALSE):
Why the side-conditions on ( Nσ)? Clearly the condition c k ∈ fv(t) comes from the intuition of N as defining a scope. We insist on k ≤ i to guarantee confluence:
2.
Proofs extend smoothly to the calculus extended with rules for N, including confluence and termination of (sigma) extended with the rules for N.
Hindley-Milner types
Some basic motivation: a type system is a logic (often a decidable logic) on terms, which allows us to reason on terms without having to evaluate them. For example, in ML if a term types has type integer, by Subject Reduction the term will always have type integer no matter how we evaluate it, and if it reduces to a normal form that normal form will be an integer. So there is no 'one' type system; it depends what properties we are interested in.
Hindley-Milner typing [7] is a simple and successful polymorphic type system which underlies functional programming languages such as Erlang [39] , ML [23] , or Haskell [34] . As such it is both a 'working (functional) programmer's' tool and a starting point for more complex schemes. If the LCC interacts well with it, then a hierarchy of variables can be implemented, at least in principle, as an extension of functional programming as we know it in common practice.
Fix infinitely many type variables α, β ∈ TyVar. Types and type schemes are defined by:
Let a type substitution, we generally write S or T , be a function from type variables α to types τ such that Sα = α for all but finitely many α. Type substitutions act on types in the standard way. Write τ σ when there is some substitution S such that
• σ = ∀α 1 . · · · ∀α n . τ (we shall just write σ = ∀α. τ for this), • Sα = α implies that α occurs in α (we may say 'S acts only on variables in α'), and
Also write tyv τ for the type variables appearing in τ .
A type context is a finite set of pairs {x 1 : σ 1 , . . . , x n : σ n } such that if x i = x j then i = j for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. Type contexts may be empty. Γ ranges over type contexts.
Then typing rules are as follows:
The notation n j , α ∈ Γ in (Ty N) is shorthand for 'n j and α do not occur anywhere in the syntax of Γ'. The notation tyv Γ in (Tyσ) is shorthand for the type variables occurring free in Γ. For example tyv {c : ∀α. α → β} = {β}.
Abusing notation write Γ \ c for the typing context obtained from Γ by removing from it c : σ if there is some σ such that c : σ ∈ Γ.
Write Γ, c : σ for (Γ \ c) ∪ {c : σ}.
We have to be a little careful proving Lemma 46. In 'normal' λ-calculus we can always rename a λ-abstracted variable to avoid any clash with names in the type context, if this is convenient. In LCC this is not the case; for example if x has level 1 and X has level 2, then we cannot rename x in λx.X. This difficulty is easily surmounted with just a little care, as follows:
If S is a finite set of variables write Γ| S for the typing context Γ restricted to S; for example {c : τ, c : τ }| {a,c} = {c : τ }.
Lemma 46 (Weakening)
Proof We prove the first part by induction on the derivation; the corollary is an easy consequence of it:
• The case of (Tya). . . . is routine.
• The case of (Tyλ). Suppose Γ, a i : τ s : τ . By inductive hypothesis (Γ, a i : τ )| fv(s) s : τ .
By some easy set calculations, and using the corollary if a i ∈ fv(s),
We may then use (Tyλ) to deduce that Γ| fv λa i .s : τ → τ as required.
• The case of (Tyσ)
By elementary calculations on sets and using the corollary if a i ∈ fv(s) we deduce that
The result follows observing that fv(s[a i →s ]) = (fv(s) \ {a i }) ∪ fv(s ).
• The case of (Ty N). Suppose that Γ, n j : α s : τ where n j and α do not occur in Γ. By inductive hypothesis (Γ, n j : α)| fv(s) s : τ . By elementary set calculations and using the corollary if n j ∈ fv(s) we deduce that Γ| fv(s) , n j : α s : τ . The result follows.
• The case of (Typ) . . . is easy. Proof We check the rules for .
• The case of (β). Suppose that Γ (λa i .s)t : τ is derivable. By following the typing derivation rules we see that for some τ , Γ, a i : τ s : τ and Γ t : τ must be derivable. It is then easy to use (Tyσ) to deduce that Γ s[a i →t] : τ , since τ ∀α. τ for any α.
• The case of (σa) . . . is easy.
• The case of (σfv). Suppose that Γ s[a i →t] : τ and suppose that a i #fv(s).
It follows that a i ∈ fv(s). By following the typing derivation rules we see that Γ t : τ Γ, a i : ∀α. τ s : τ where α = tyv τ \ tyv Γ. Now if a i ∈ fv(s) then by Lemma 46 also Γ s : τ and we are done.
• The case of (σp). Suppose that Γ (s s)[a i →t] : τ . Then for some τ is must be that
Here α = tyv τ \ tyv Γ. Using (σp) it is immediate that
• The case of (σσ). Suppose Γ s[a i →t][b j →u] : τ . Then for some τ and τ ,
Here α = tyv τ \ tyv Γ and α = tyv τ \ tyv (Γ, ∀α . τ ). It is not hard to calculate that α = α , so we write α for both henceforth. From this we can calculate that
and from this we can conclude that
• The cases of (σλ) and (σλ ). Suppose Γ (λn j .t)[a i →u] : τ → τ is derivable. By following the typing derivation rules we see that Γ u : τ and Γ, a i : ∀α. τ , n j : τ t : τ must be derivable, where α = tyv τ \ tyv Γ. Without loss of generality we rename elements of α to be disjoint from tyv τ . It is now not hard to derive Γ λn j .(t[a i →u]) : τ → τ , using Lemma 46 to weaken Γ u : τ to Γ, n j : τ u : τ .
• The case of ( Np). Suppose that Γ ( Nn j .s)t : τ is derivable where (renaming n j if necessary) we suppose n j does not occur in t or Γ. Then Γ, n j : α s : τ → τ and Γ t : τ are derivable, where α ∈ Γ. By Lemma 46 also Γ, n j : α t : τ is derivable.
It is now easy to derive Γ Nn j .(st) : τ .
• The cases of ( Nσ) and ( N ∈) are easy.
2
We use the following technical lemma in Theorem 49:
Proof By induction on the derivation of Γ s : τ .
2
Write (S , τ ) (S, τ ) when there is some T such that
• S = T S (type substitutions are written prefix, so T S is 'S followed by T '), and
A type problem is a pair (Γ ? s). A solution to (Γ ? s) is a pair (S, τ ) such that SΓ s : τ . A principal solution is a solution (S, τ ) which is maximal amongst all solutions to (Γ ? s) in the ordering given by .
Theorem 49 If Γ ? s has a solution, then it has a principal solution.
Proof A principal solution (S, τ ) is calculated by the algorithm below -the rules are read bottom-up, and we write (Γ sol s) for the pair (S, τ ) which is being calculated:
In the rule for a i , Id is the identity type substitution, which is such that Idα = α.
In the rule for application mgu(S τ, τ → α) is the most general unifier of S τ and τ → α; that is it is a substitution such that S S τ = S (τ → α) (a unifier of S τ and τ → α) which is msot general in the sense that all other unifiers are of the form S S for some S . This is standard, see elsewhere [7] . The mgu need not exist, for example mgu(α , α → α) does not exist. It is part of the condition for using the rule for application above, that mgu(S τ, τ → α) does exist. It is a fact that if a unifier of two types exists, then a most general unifier exists.
In the rule for N, consistent with previous usage α ∈ Γ means 'α does not occur anywhere in the syntax of Γ'.
The typing rules and principal types algorithm above are identical to those of the standard Hindley-Milner; we give our explicit substitution exactly the rules for the ML let construct.
The proofs transfer to this setting unchanged from the original presentations [7, 6] , because the definitions are identical -except for the case of N, which is new.
It is routine to show by induction that if (Γ sol s) exists then it is a solution to Γ ? s.
It remains to show that if a solution to (Γ ? s) exists, then the algorithm for calculating (Γ sol s) calculates a principal solution. We consider only the cases of a i and Na i .s:
• The case of a i . Suppose that
By the form of the typing rules it must be that a i : ∀α. τ ∈ Γ for some α and τ such that τ = S τ . Here we assume (renaming if necessary) that S acts trivially on α and that no variable in α occurs free in Γ. We take T = S , and we are done. • The case of Na i .s. Suppose that S Γ Na i .s : τ .
By the form of the typing rules it must be that S Γ, a i : α s : τ .
By inductive hypothesis (Γ sol s) calculates a principal solution, write it (S, τ ), so there is some T such that T S = S and T Sτ = τ , and we are done.
In conclusion, the type system is almost identical to a standard Hindley-Milner type system for polymorphic types. The typing rule for explicit substitutions is identical to that of ML let. The hierarchy of variables does not damage the type system in any way. There also seems no a priori reason that LCC would not accommodate any other type systems developed for functional programming.
Applicative characterisation of contextual equivalence
As our final theoretical investigation we consider contextual equivalence of the LCC.
Programs, contexts, evaluations, and equivalences
It is convenient to introduce a constant such that .
Definition 50 Call s a program when fv(s) = ∅.
As is our convention, take x to have level 1 and X to have level 2. For example:
• x and λx.X are not programs; fv(x) = {x} and fv(λx.X) = {X}.
• λx. We may abuse notation and call D a context.
For example:
• λX.X, λX.λx.(xX)X, and λX. are contexts.
• λX.x is not a context because it is not a program; fv(λX.x) = {x}.
• λx.λX.Xx is not a context.
• λX.λY.XY is not a context.
• λX.λy.XXy is a context.
An equivalence relation is a transitive symmetric reflexive relation. Call an equivalence relation X on programs contextual when
Here C ranges over contexts and s and t range over programs. Write = ctx for the greatest contextual equivalence, which (abusing notation) we call contextual equivalence. We discuss this definition below.
Call an equivalence relation P on programs applicative when ∀s, t. s P t ⇒ ∀u. su P tu ∀s, t. s P t ∧ s ⇒ t .
Here s, t, and u range over programs. Write = ap for the greatest applicative equivalence and abuse notation calling it applicative equivalence.
The main result of this section is
Theorem 51 = ctx and = ap are equal.
. . . but we need technical machinery to prove it.
Lemma 52 Write s ↔ t for the least equivalence relation containing . Then
Also, s 1 . . . s n = ap t 1 . . . t n always, for n > 0.
Proof Suppose s ↔ t. By confluence Theorem 25 su if and only if tu ,
and similarly for Cs and Ct.
For the second part we examine the reduction rules and observe that s 1 . . . s n is impossible unless n = 0. In the proofs below we tend to use traditional notation of
We can also characterise = ctx as the greatest congruence (Definition 4; extended with the rule for N from Subsection 6.1) such that
We do not explore this further because the definition of = ctx which we use is more convenient for the proof-method to follow.
Proof that = ctx equals = ap
Suppose s and t are programs and s = ctx t. We want to show that s = ap t.
By the coinductive principle by which = ap was defined, it suffices to show that if s = ctx t then:
• If s then t .
• For any program u it is the case that su = ctx tu.
The first part follows directly from our assumption that s = ctx t.
Also for any program u, the term (d l u) is a context (where d l is a variable which we choose stronger than any variable in s or u). By assumption
To take the next step and reduce these to su and tu we need Lemmas 53 and 54.
Proof By an easy induction on the definition of level(s) (Definition 2). 2
Lemma 54 Suppose s and u are any terms (we only care about the case that s and u are programs). Suppose further that d l is a variable such that l > level(s, u).
Proof The reduction path is as follows:
For the reduction with (σfv) we use Lemma 53. 2
By Lemma 52 we have that su = ctx tu, and we are done. Now suppose that s = ap t. We want to prove that s = ctx t. By the coinductive principle by which = ctx was defined, it suffices to show that if s = ap t then:
• For any context D it is the case that Ds = ap Dt. In the the cases below we may implicitly use the first part of Lemma 52 along with confluence and the inductive hypothesis, to suppose that D is in -normal form. We also silently strip leading Ns, writing for example d l for Na.d l .
We use the first part of Lemma 52 and the fact that = ap is an equivalence. 
Here we choose x m fresh and stronger than d l . We justify the steps of this reasoning, which we numbered on the right above: 
is not a normal form, because of (σa).
because of (σfv). · D = c k for c k stronger than n j and (by assumption) not equal to d l . It is not possible for c k [n j →D ][d l →u] to evaluate to for any u, so there is nothing to prove.
That concludes the proof of Theorem 51.
Related work, conclusions, and future work
In a previous conference paper we presented the NEW calculus of contexts [9] . The LCC of this journal paper updates and improves that that work. The LCC is simpler than the NEWcc. Compare the side-condition of (σa) (there is none) with that of (σa) from [9] . The notion of freshness is simpler and intuitive; we no longer require a logic of freshness, or the 'freshness context with sufficient freshnesses', see most of page 4 in [9] . A key innovation in attaining this simplicity is our use of conditions involving level(s) the level of s, which includes information about the levels of free and bound variables, and the condition on rule (σp).
But there is a price: the LCC has fewer reductions. Notably (σλ ) will not reduce (λa i .s)[c k →u] where k < i; a rule (σλ ) in [9] does. However that stronger version seems to be a major source of complexity. Do we miss the extra reductions? An insight that was necessary to make this paper is that certain reductions which we thought were important, could be dropped.
Still, it is clear that we are approximating something larger. Other papers on nominal techniques have useful elements which we can import, now that we have a solid basis to work from.
In this paper we cannot α-convert x in λx.X. Nominal terms can: swappings are in the syntax (here swappings are purely a meta-level) and also freshness contexts [36] . A problem is that we do not yet understand the theory of swappings for strong variables; the underlying Fraenkel-Mostowski sets model [13] only has (in the terminology of this paper) one level of variable. A semantic model of the hierarchy of variables would be useful and this is current work.
In this paper we cannot deduce x#fv(λx.X) even though for every instance this does hold (for example x#λx.x and x#λx.y). Hierarchical nominal rewriting [10] has a more powerful notion of freshness which can prove the equivalent of x#fv(λx.X). Note that hierarchical nominal rewriting does have the conditions on levels which we use to good effect in this paper.
We cannot reduce (λx.y)[y →Y ] because there is no z such that z#Y . We can allow programs to dynamically generate fresh variables in the style of FreshML [25] or the style of a sequent calculus for Nominal Logic by Cheney [5] .
Finally, we cannot reduce
]. Other work [12] gives an equational system which can do this, and more.
Desirable and nontrivial meta-properties of the λ-calculus survive in the LCC. The LCC is confluent. It supports a type system in Hindley-Milner style making it possible, in principle at least, to envisage an extension of ML or Haskell with meta-variables based on the LCC's notion of strong and weak variables. Also, contextual equivalence coincides with applicative equivalence -a full treatment will be in a longer paper. This is a surprising result considering that substitution in the LCC can capture.
More related work (not using nominal techniques). The calculi of contexts λm and λM [30] also have a hierarchy of variables. They use carefullycrafted scoping conventions to manage problems with α-conversion. Other work [28, 16, 29] uses a type system; connections with this work are unclear. λc of Bognar's thesis contains [4, Section 2] an extensive literature survey on the topic of context calculi.
A separation of abstraction λ and binding N appears in one other (unpublished) work we know of [32] , where they are called q and ν. In this vein there is [17] , which manages scope explicitly in a completely different way, just for the fun. Finally, the reduction rules of N look remarkably similar to π-calculus restriction [21] , and it is probably quite accurate to think of N as a 'restriction in the λ-calculus'.
Hamana takes a semantic approach to meta-variables [15] . We have not developed the semantic theory of the LCC. We should do this in future work, and when we do we would expect to arrive at something similar to Hamana's construction. However we do not expect the semantics to be identical; ours it will be phrased in terms of sets and permutation actions (in keeping with the first author's previous work [13] ). These have slightly stronger, and in our opinion more desirable, properties than the categories of presheaves which Hamana uses.
Ours is a calculus with explicit substitutions. See [20] for a survey. Our treatment of substitution is simple-minded but still quite subtle because of interactions with the rest of the language. We note that the translation of possibly open terms of the untyped λ-calculus into the LCC preserves strong normalisation. One reduction rule, (σfv), is a little unusual amongst such calculi, though it appears as Bloo's 'garbage collection' [3] .
The look and feel of the LCC is squarely that of a λ-calculus with explicit substitutions. All the real cleverness has been isolated in the side-condition of (σp); other side-conditions are obvious given an intuition that strong variables can cause capturing substitution (in the NEWcc [9] complexity spilled over into other rules and into a logic for freshness). N is only necessary when variables of different strengths occur, and the hierarchy of variables only plays a rôle to trigger side-conditions. Further work. We discussed above how to add off-the-shelf elements of nominal techniques, if we want to give ourselves more reductions.
Another possibility is in the direction of logic, treating equality instead of reduction and imitating higher-order logic, which is based on the simply-typed λ-terms enriched with constants such as ∀ : (o → o) → o and ⇒: o → o → o where o is a type of truth-values [38] , along with suitable equalities and/or derivation rules. Because the LCC admits a Hindley-Milner style type system it certainly admits a simple type system. There should be no problem with writing down a 'context higher-order logic'. This takes the LCC in the direction of calculi of contexts for incomplete proofs [18, 14] , and also in the direction of giving semantics to existential variables in logic-programming (unpublished work by Lipton and Mariño). The non-trivial work (in no particular order) is to investigate cut-elimination, develop a suitable theory of models, and to check whether and how usefully the LCC can be used as-is to model incomplete proofs of some theorem-proving system. One important element is the denotation semantics of the hierarchy of variables -we do not yet have one; this is current work.
Certain specific ideas appear elsewhere in the literature which the LCC cannot express, but they might be accommodated with a relatively straightforward extension.
As discussed, the LCC can express [ This is not the intended operational behaviour (if we intended to abstract over the name of x and replace it by y). Variables can be substituted for so it should not possible to pass a variable name as a first-class value. An extension of the LCC based on atom from [11] may be possible and useful.
The LCC cannot express 'substitute all variables of level 1 for t in s', which we might write as s [ →t] . This idea appears in work by Dami [8] on dynamic binding. We do believe that the LCC could have something to contribute to dynamic binding and linking, since they seem to have to do with capturing substitution, but that is future work.
Languages for staged computation, for example MetaML [22, 26] , Template Haskell [31] , and Converge [35] , have a hierarchy (of stages) reminiscent of our hierarchy of levels. They offer a program enough control of its own execution that it can suspend its own execution, compose suspended programs into larger (suspended) programs, pass suspended programs as arguments to functions, and evaluate them. This raises issues similar to those surrounding contexts. The LCC cannot model staged computation because it is a pure rewrite system with no control of evaluation order. Even if we choose some evaluation order on the LCC to make it into a programming language, the deeper problem is that the LCC has no first-class construct to promote variables between levels. Adding this extension is interesting future work.
In conclusion: the LCC of this paper is simple, clear, and it has good properties. It seems to hit a technical sweet spot. Often in computer science the trick is to find a useful balance between simplicity and expressivity. Perhaps the LCC does that.
